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Abstract This paper addresses two empirical questions. Is fiscal policy affected by up-
coming elections? If so, do election-motivated fiscal policies enhance the probability of
re-election of the incumbent? Employing data for 65 democratic countries over 1975–2005
in a semi-pooled panel model, we find that in most countries fiscal policy is hardly affected
by elections. The countries for which we find a significant political budget cycle are very
diverse. They include ‘young’ democracies but also ‘established’ democracies. In countries
with a political budget cycle, election-motivated fiscal policies have a significant positive
(but fairly small) effect on the electoral support for the political parties in government.
Keywords Election outcomes · Political budget cycles · Multilevel model
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses two empirical questions. Is fiscal policy affected by upcoming elec-
tions? If so, do election-motivated fiscal policies enhance the probability of re-election of
the incumbent?
As to the first issue: several recent studies suggest that political budget cycles occur, but
there is disagreement about the circumstances making election-motivated budget deficits
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more likely. For instance, opinions differ as to whether political budget cycles are more
likely in ‘young’ democracies compared to ‘established’ democracies (Persson and Tabellini
2002; Shi and Svensson 2006; Brender and Drazen 2005).
It is quite surprising that the second issue has hardly been researched. Brender and
Drazen (2008) do not find evidence that election-motivated budget deficits enhance the
chances of re-election of the incumbent. In fact, they even report that these deficits reduce the
probability that an incumbent is re-elected as voters punish politicians who create deficits.1
Our analysis is based on data for 65 democratic countries over the period 1975 to 2005.
To estimate the impact of election-induced fiscal policy on the incumbent’s support we use
a two-step approach. In the first step, we estimate whether elections affect the government’s
budget balance and government spending. Most recent studies on election-motivated fiscal
policy at the national level use panel models for a large sample of countries, pooling the
data. However, in view of the heterogeneity of the countries included in those studies, it is
questionable whether the data can be pooled (Pesaran et al. 1996). According to Pesaran
et al. (1999), neglecting parameter heterogeneity in a pooled panel estimation procedure
can produce inconsistent and misleading estimates of the long-run coefficients. Tests of
heterogeneity indicate that our data cannot be pooled. We therefore use a semi-pooled model
suggested by Hsiao et al. (1999). In this model, the political budget cycle (PBC) effect
varies across countries, while the other control variables are restricted to be homogenous.
Employing an election variable that takes the timing of the election in the course of the year
into account as suggested by Franzese (2000), we find that fiscal policy in most—but not
all—countries in our sample is hardly affected by upcoming elections. The countries for
which we find a significant political budget cycle are very diverse. They include ‘young’
democracies but also ‘established’ democracies.
In the second step of our analysis, we examine for countries with election-motivated fiscal
policy, whether this PBC increases electoral support for the incumbent. In contrast to Bren-
der and Drazen (2008), we take into account that many countries have coalition governments
(Hanusch 2012). We therefore focus on votes received by political parties participating in
the government. We conclude that government spending has a significant positive (but fairly
small) effect on the electoral support for the parties in government. We also find an indirect
positive effect of election-motivated fiscal policy through its impact on economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses in more
detail how our contribution is related to previous studies of political budget cycles and eco-
nomic voting. Section 3 shows our results for the influence of elections on fiscal policy,
while Sect. 4 presents our estimates of the relationship between political budget cycles and
election outcomes. The final section offers our conclusions.
2 Previous studies
We combine two strands of the political economy literature. The first one addresses the
existence of a political budget cycle. Older theoretical PBC models emphasize the incum-
bent’s intention to secure re-election by maximizing his/her expected vote share at the next
election (Nordhaus 1975). It is assumed that the electorate is backward looking and eval-
uates the government on the basis of its past track record. As a result, these models imply
that governments, regardless of ideological orientation, adopt expansionary fiscal policies in
1In Sect. 2, we will also discuss some recent studies on the effect of fiscal policy on local election outcomes.
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the late year(s) of their terms in office in order to stimulate the economy (Potrafke 2012).
More recent PBC models emphasize the role of temporary information asymmetries regard-
ing the politicians’ competence level in explaining electoral cycles in fiscal policy. In these
models, signalling is the driving force behind the PBC (see, e.g., Rogoff and Sibert 1988;
Persson and Tabellini 2002; and Shi and Svensson 2006). For instance, in the moral haz-
ard model of political competition of Shi and Svensson (2006), politicians may behave
opportunistically even if most voters know the government’s policy, but some voters are
uninformed. The larger is the number of voters that fail (ex ante) to distinguish election-
motivated fiscal policy manipulations from incumbent competence, the more the incumbent
profits from boosting expenditures before an election. Alt and Lassen (2006) argue that the
greater is the transparency of the political process, the lower is the probability that politicians
behave opportunistically. Drazen and Eslava (2006, 2010) explain the relationship between
opportunistic spending of the government and the election outcome within a game theoretic
framework. The incumbent uses public expenditure to attract votes. In equilibrium, expen-
ditures targeted to particular voters are higher in an election period than in a non-election
period. Swing voters will rationally vote for the incumbent who provides more targeted
expenditures even though they know that such expenditures may be electorally motivated.
Brender and Drazen (2005) argue that until recently a PBC was generally thought to
be a phenomenon of less developed economies. For instance, Schuknecht (1996) reports
evidence for a PBC in his sample of 35 developing countries over the period 1975–1992.
Likewise, Block (2002) finds for a cross-section of 44 Sub-Saharan African countries that
the government’s budget deficit increases by 1.2 percentage points in election years.2 How-
ever, several recent studies present evidence for the existence of a PBC in a large cross-
section of both advanced and developing countries. For instance, Shi and Svensson (2006)
report significant pre-electoral increases in the government budget deficit for their panel of
85 developing and advanced countries over the period 1975–1995. Moreover, Persson and
Tabellini (2002) find statistically significant tax decreases before elections in their sample
of 60 democracies over the period 1960–1998. According to Brender and Drazen (2005),
the results of the studies of Shi and Svensson (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2002) are
driven by the experiences of so-called ‘new democracies’, where fiscal manipulation may
be effective because of the lack of familiarity with electoral politics in these countries. They
argue that once the ‘new democracies’ are removed from the sample, evidence in support of
the PBC disappears.
However, several recent studies also focusing on ‘established democracies’ report evi-
dence on the existence of a PBC. For instance, Grier (2008) reports that the timing of elec-
tions exerts a significant influence on quarterly real GDP growth in the US, while Tujula and
Wolswijk (2007) find support for a PBC in their sample of OECD countries for the period
1975–2002. Mink and De Haan (2006) provide similar evidence for European Union (EU)
member states after the start of the monetary union.3 Similarly, Efthyvoulou (2011) reports
for the 27 EU member states over the period 1997–2008 that incumbent governments tend to
2Similarly, Schuknecht (2000) finds for a sample of twenty-four developing countries over 1973–1992 that
incumbent governments tend to increase public investment prior to elections. Vergne (2009), using data on
24 developing countries from 1975 to 2001, reports that elections shift the composition of spending towards
current expenditures and away from capital expenditures.
3Also several studies of local elections report evidence of a PBC. A recent example is the study of Aidt
et al. (2011), who also provide references to previous studies. Aidt et al. use data from 278 Portuguese
municipalities from 1979 to 2005 and find that the cycle is largest when the need for the incumbent to signal
competency is at its peak.
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manipulate fiscal policy in order to maximize their chances of being re-elected. He finds that
the relative importance of non-economic issues prior to elections and the uncertainty over
the electoral outcome can to a large extent explain the variability in the sizes of PBCs across
and within the EU countries. Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) examine the impact of elections
on different types of fiscal expenditure and revenue for a sample of 19 ‘old’ democracies
over the period 1972–1999. They report that elections shift the composition of public ex-
penditures towards current expenditures and away from capital expenditures. However, they
do not find evidence of an electoral cycle for government deficits and expenditures, but do
find a negative effect of elections on revenues.
In view of the heterogeneity of our sample, we allow the impact of elections to vary across
countries.4 Our results suggest that fiscal policy in most—but not all—countries in our sam-
ple is hardly affected by upcoming elections. The countries for which we find a significant
political budget cycle are very diverse. Some of them are developing countries, while others
are OECD countries. They include ‘young’ democracies but also ‘old’ democracies.
The second strand of literature on which the current paper is based focuses on the eco-
nomic determinants of election outcomes. Following studies such as those of Kramer (1971),
Tufte (1978) and Hibbs (1987)—who all find that outcomes of U.S. presidential elections
are influenced by the performance of the U.S. economy—many subsequent studies have
examined the impact of the state of the economy on voting behavior. There is substantial ev-
idence that the state of the economy affects voting behavior. Lewis-Beck (1988) finds this,
for instance, for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Indeed, in their re-
view of the economic voting literature Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000: 211) conclude that
“Economics and elections form a tight weave. . . . For all democratic nations that have re-
ceived a reasonable amount of study, plausible economic indicators, objective or subjective,
can be shown to account for much of the variance in government support.”
Brender and Drazen (2008) provide three reasons why expansionary fiscal policies in
a pre-election year may lead to a higher re-election probability. First, a fiscal expansion
could stimulate economic growth. Voters may interpret more vigorous economic growth as
a signal of a talented incumbent, thereby making reelection more likely. Second, government
expenditures for special target groups may increase the number of votes given by this group
to the incumbent. Finally, voters may simply prefer low taxes and high spending and reward
politicians who deliver these.
A few recent studies use local election data to examine whether fiscal policy affects
the incumbent’s re-election chances. These studies report mixed results. Brender (2003)
does not find robust results using data for Israel, while Aidt et al. (2011) conclude that
expansionary fiscal policy increases the win margin of Portuguese mayors. Using data for
Colombian municipalities, Drazen and Eslava (2010) provide evidence that a pre-electoral
increase in targeted expenditures combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure
affect voter behavior.
Brender and Drazen (2008) is the only study of which we are aware that refers to the
effect of election-induced fiscal policy at the national level. Employing data for a sample of
74 countries over the period 1960–2003, these authors do not find evidence that election-
motivated budget deficits enhance the chances of re-election of the incumbent. In fact, they
even report that these deficits reduce the incumbent’s chances of reelection as voters punish
politicians who create deficits. Our study differs from Brender and Drazen’s work, as we do
4Similarly, Bayar and Smeets (2009) use a dynamic random coefficient model to explain the relation between
government deficits and elections in EU countries. In line with the results of Mink and De Haan (2006), they
find evidence for opportunistic behavior of policymakers in the majority of the EU countries.
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not analyze whether the Chief Executive benefits from election-motivated fiscal policies. As
Hanusch (2012) points out, certainly in the OECD but also in other parts of the world, the
government is formed by a coalition of parties. Although it seems safe to assume that each
coalition member seeks re-election, some parties may gain more from budget manipulation
than others. That is why we focus on the electoral support that the political parties in gov-
ernment receive. We also take the potential indirect effect of election-induced expansionary
fiscal policies on economic growth into account as economic growth has been found to be
an important determinant of election outcomes in the voting literature.
3 Political budget cycles
3.1 Data and method
We use a large unbalanced cross-country time-series dataset for 65 advanced and developing
countries over the period 1975 to 2005. We consider only country-years with a minimum
level of democracy as the theory of the PBC presumes that competitive elections take place.
We therefore enter only country-years with a Polity IV democracy score of at least six.5
Appendix 1 lists all countries and years in our dataset. The fiscal data are taken from the
International Financial Statistics and the Government Finance Statistics of the IMF, while
the election data come from electionsource.org and various issues of the Political Handbook
of the World. Appendix 2 provides a detailed description of all data used and their sources.
The model can be specified as6:
fit = (α + ηi) + βfit−1 + γXjit−1 + λELECit × ηi + εit . (1)
The variable fit is a fiscal indicator (budget balance or total spending) in country i in year
t , Xjit−1 is a vector of (lagged) control variables with j elements, ELECit is an election
variable, ηi is a country fixed effect, and εit is an error term. Several election studies, such
as Persson and Tabellini (2002), Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006),
use pooled time-series to identify the presence of a political budget cycle. However, it is
questionable whether a pooled estimator is the appropriate estimation technique in view
of the possible heterogeneity in our large sample. To examine this issue in more detail,
we perform a modified Chow test on the election coefficient suggested by Baltagi (1995).
This test compares the model under the restriction of common slopes across countries with
the model that allows for heterogeneous slopes. The test statistic indicates that the null
hypothesis that the data can be pooled is rejected at conventional significance levels (the
p-value of the test is 0.03).
We therefore estimate a semi-pooled model in which all control variables have a ho-
mogenous impact, while the effect of the PBC variable is allowed to vary across countries.7
Following Franzese (2000), our election variable takes the timing of an election in the course
5According to the definition of Polity IV, countries with a score higher than six are regarded as democratic
(Jaggers et al. 2006). However, we have also adopted cut-off points of the Polity IV score of two, four and
seven. This yields very similar results (available on request).
6We also test the model with time dummies, but they turn out to be insignificant as do the interaction terms
between the time dummies and the election variable.
7We have also estimated individual regressions for each country. The results remain in line with our main
results throughout the paper. However, this reduces the degrees of freedom per country dramatically and
therefore evaluating the consistencies of the coefficients is not warranted.
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of the year into account. It is calculated as M/12 in an election year and (12 − M)/12 in a
pre-election year, where M is the month of the election. In all other years its value is set to
zero.
We consider elections only if the government has sufficient opportunity to change its
fiscal policies. It usually takes some time before the impact of election-motivated fiscal
policies becomes visible. When there are, for instance, elections shortly after the fall of a
cabinet, the government may have little chance for pursuing expansionary fiscal policy. As a
cut-off point, we use one year. So, an election is included if it is held on the fixed date (year)
specified by the constitution, or if the election occurs in the last year of a constitutionally
fixed term for the legislature. Also when an election is announced more than one year in
advance, it is taken up in the analysis.8
The vector Xjit−1 contains control variables suggested by previous studies. The controls
are entered with a one-year lag. We include real GDP per capita to control for the level
of development of a country as this could influence voters’ preferences for public goods
as well as the size of the tax base. The growth rate of real GDP captures the influence
of the business cycle. Sometimes globalization is argued to restrain governments’ fiscal
policies. We use the KOF globalization index (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2008) to control for
this. Also demographic factors may affect fiscal policies. We therefore include the so-called
dependency ratio, which measures the ratio of the elderly to people of working age. A larger
share of the elderly will lead to increases in government spending due to, for example,
greater social security and health care spending. Inflation may affect government receipts
and expenditures through nominal progression in tax rates and tax brackets, and via price-
indexation of receipts and expenditures. On the other hand, unexpected inflation erodes the
real value of nominal government debt so that the overall effect of inflation on the budget
balance is not clear a priori (Mink and De Haan 2006). Higher unemployment will increase
government spending on social security and decrease revenues, and hence raise the budget
deficit. Finally, we include a dummy variable that is one when a country is a member of a
monetary union at time t . Most monetary unions impose constraints on the public budget’s
balance, like the Stability and Growth Pact within the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU).9
We also include several political control variables suggested by previous studies. Persson
and Tabellini (2002) argue that elections may have a different effect on fiscal policy un-
der proportional and majoritarian electoral rules. Proportional elections induce politicians
to seek support from larger groups in the electorate. It is then plausible to expect budget
deficits to be larger under proportional electoral rules than under majoritarian electoral
rules. Likewise, there may be differences between parliamentary versus presidential sys-
tems. In contrast to a parliamentary system, in a presidential system the executive cannot be
brought down by the legislature, but he or she is directly accountable to the voters and this
8However, as governments were perhaps already using expansionary fiscal policy before announcing the
election date, we have also estimated all regressions reported in this paper including all elections. Our main
findings are very similar to those presented in the paper. The results are available on request.
9We have experimented with three alternatives. The first dummy takes the value one in EMU countries be-
tween 1992 and 1998. The second dummy takes the value one in EMU countries after 1998 and the final
dummy also takes the value one in monetary unions other than the EMU. The results of the models using the
first two dummies instead of the third one are very similar to those reported.
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may affect fiscal policy. We therefore include dummy variables that are 1 for majoritarian
systems and parliamentary systems, respectively.10
Furthermore, coalition governments arguably have different fiscal policies than single-
party governments. Due to the common pool problem, government expenditures and budget
deficits are expected to be larger the more parties take part in government.
We also include a partisan variable to control for differences between right and left wing
governments in fiscal policy. According to the partisan approach, politicians focus on the in-
terests of their respective constituencies. There is evidence suggesting that spending priories
differ among right and left wing governments, but whether partisan factors influence budget
deficits is less clear (cf. Hallerberg and Clark 2000). Our partisan variable is measured on a
scale running from −1 (full left wing) to +1 (full right wing). The variable is based on the
data provided by the Database on Political Institutions of the World Bank. All explanatory
variables are lagged to avoid simultaneity and endogeneity problems. The lag structure is
determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion.
3.2 Empirical results
Table 1 presents the estimation results of Eq. (1). To obtain robust and consistent standard
errors we use the bootstrap method with 1,000 replications.11
We find a significant effect of the dependency ratio on fiscal policy. A larger popula-
tion share of the elderly raises government spending and lowers government revenues and
therefore the budget deficit rises. Also the unemployment rate and economic growth affect
fiscal policy outcomes, but income per capita and inflation turn out to be insignificant. Our
results suggest that left-wing governments have larger budget deficits than right-wing gov-
ernments. Left-wing governments spend more than right-wing governments, but do not raise
taxes accordingly. The coefficient of the KOF globalization indicator is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Our results also suggest that governments in a majoritarian electoral system
spend more than governments in a proportional electoral system and that membership in a
monetary union reduces the budget deficit.
Most importantly, we find that on average elections hardly affect fiscal policy. The elec-
tion variable is significant only at the 10 % level in the model for government spending,
but not in the model for the government budget balance. However, we do find significant
political budget cycle effects in some countries, which are identified in Appendix 1. The
PBC effect for each country is determined by estimating the cross-partial derivative and the
corresponding t-value. The countries for which we find a significant political budget cycle
are very diverse. Some of them are developing countries, while others are OECD countries.
They include ‘young’ democracies but also ‘old’ democracies. The latter finding does not
lend support to the view that PBCs occur only in countries that have little experience with
democratic elections. In Sect. 4.3 we will examine this argument of Brender and Drazen
(2005) in more detail.
In 23 countries we find a significant effect of elections on the budget balance. As the de-
tailed results in Appendix 1 show, the significant effect varies between −2.56 % for Turkey
to −0.13 % for Italy. For government spending we find for 24 countries a significant election
effect; the estimated coefficient varies between 2.45 for Japan to 0.19 for Norway.
10We examine whether a president has legislative powers in the realm of fiscal policy. If not, and if the
government is accountable to parliament through a confidence requirement, the country is classified as a
parliamentary regime.
11We clustered the standard errors using the Huber-White procedure.
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Table 1 Semi-pooled model—estimation results for Eq. (1)
Dependent variable
Budget balance Total spending
(1) (2)
Lagged dependent variable 0.375** 0.769**
[2.86] [2.63]
Partisan variable 0.408** −0.553*
[2.80] [−1.74]
Parliamentary electoral system −1.429 1.871
[−1.31] [1.42]
Majoritarian electoral system −2.032** 1.986**
[−2.06] [2.00]
Number of coalition parties −0.509 0.467
[−0.35] [0.31]
Globalization −0.347 0.838
[−1.26] [0.90]
Age dependency ratio −0.989** 0.329**
[−2.95] [2.26]
Unemployment rate −0.591** 0.180*
[−2.25] [1.80]
Economic growth 0.029** −0.027
[3.03] [−2.77]
Income per capita 0.529* −0.440
[1.66] [−1.07]
Inflation rate −0.151 −0.110
[−1.06] [−0.94]
Monetary union 0.101** −0.089
[2.01] [1.43]
Election −0.888 0.311*
[−1.47] [1.79]
Number of observations 1493 1493
Number of countries 65 65
Log likelihood test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
Note: t-values are shown in parentheses. */** indicates significance at 10/5 percent, respectively
4 Effect of political budget cycles on election outcomes
4.1 Method
Next, we estimate the effect (if any) of election-motivated fiscal policy on election outcomes.
Most election studies focus on the re-election of (the party of) the chief executive (see, for
example, Brender and Drazen 2005 and Dreher 2004). This makes sense in a one-party-
government system, but less so in a multi-party coalition system. In such a system, one
party in government may lose support from the electorate, while other coalition parties may
gain votes.
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We therefore focus on the effect of fiscal policy on the votes received by individual parties
in (coalition) governments. We formulate a multilevel (i.e., party b and coalition q)12 model
given by:
vbqe = αbq + βqyEqe + θbqXjbqe + γqPBCqe + uvbe + uvqe, (2)
where vbqe is the change in the percentage of votes to party b that is in government coali-
tion q in election e,13 yEqe is the economic growth rate in an election year that we include to
examine a possible indirect effect of election-motivated expansionary fiscal policy on vbqe .
The parameters uvbe , and uvqe are the error terms on party and coalition level, respectively.
The election year economic growth rate is computed as follows:
yEqe =
M × yqt + (12 − M) × yqt−1
12
, (3)
where M is the election month and yqt is the economic growth rate in period t .14
The variable Xjbqe is a vector of control variables with j elements. The variables in
Xjbqe are defined as averages during the incumbent government’s term in office. This vector
contains variables suggested by the literature on economic voting, political controls, and
controls referring to the incumbent government and individual political parties.
In the first place, the findings of Kramer (1971), Tufte (1978), Hibbs (1987), Lewis-Beck
(1988), Nannestad and Paldam (1994) suggest not only that stronger economic growth, but
also that lower inflation and less unemployment may have a positive effect on the re-election
of the incumbent. Likewise, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2006) argue that the level of welfare
spending also increases the number of votes received by the incumbent party.15 Since income
inequality may affect the number of votes received by the incumbent, we also take it up as a
control variable.
In the second place, we control for some political variables. First, we include a measure
of political protest, calculated as the first principal component of government crises, cabinet
changes, anti-governmental demonstrations, and strikes (taken from Databanks International
2005). A high level of protest activity indicates that the government is not popular among
voters.
Second, we add a proxy for political polarization in a country. It is measured by the
difference between the ideology of the incumbent government and the ideology of the two
largest opposition parties. In a highly polarized environment the probability of policy dis-
agreements is relatively high, which, in turn may lead to a less effective government and
therefore less support from the electorate for the parties in government.
Third, we include two indicators of the political system (majoritarian versus proportional
systems and parliamentary versus presidential systems).
Finally, an increase in the number of parties participating in the election may affect the
number of votes received by the (parties of the) incumbent government due to a competition
effect. We therefore control for this. Likewise, we also control for voter turnout.
12Following Roubini and Sachs (1989), a presidential system is treated in the same way as a one-party
government.
13Using the change in the number of seats in parliament yields the same conclusion. The correlation between
votes received and seats received is about 0.9.
14As a robustness test, we have also used a pre-election economic growth period of six months. The results
remain in line with the results reported in the main text and are available upon request.
15We leave out total government spending because of multicollinearity with welfare spending.
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In the third place, we include several variables that represent some characteristics of the
incumbent coalition. First, we include a dummy variable that is one if the chief executive is
in his last term, thereby controlling for a ‘personality effect’ according to which voters cast
their vote primarily on the basis of the popularity of the chief executive. Second, we take
up a variable reflecting the coalition’s ideological position to control for partisan effects.
Third, we include the Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on the number of seats of the
governing parties in parliament as an indicator of the division of power within the coalition.
The larger is the index, the more powerful one coalition party is and therefore the more likely
that government policies will be attributed to this party. Fourth, we add a dummy variable
that reflects that a government is a minority government. Fifth, we include the number of
coalition parties. Sixth, we consider the number of years a party has been in government.
This variable is included, since after a number of years in power voters often demand change.
So the number of years in government will have a negative effect on votes received in the
next election. Finally, we take up a dummy that is one in case a political party is the largest
coalition party and zero for the other parties in the coalition.
In the fourth place, we take individual government party characteristics into account
by adding two party ideology dummies. The first dummy is one if a government party is
nationalistic, and zero otherwise. The second dummy is one if a political party is a special
interest party based on region or political issues, and zero otherwise. These variables are
taken from the updated figures from Beck et al. (2001).16
Finally, we include a measure reflecting the political budget cycle (PBC). We use two
different PBC indicators. First, we re-estimate Eq. (1), dropping the election variable. The
error term captures the unexplained part of the fiscal variable concerned along with the
election effect. As our first PBC indicator, we use the difference between the error term in an
election year and the average error term during the term in office of the government (PBC1).
To calculate our second PBC indicator, we use the election coefficient λ in regression (1).
Based on the statistical significance of λ we construct a dummy variable taking the value
one when λ is significant at a 10 % significance level and zero otherwise.17 So, PBC2 is
computed as follows:
PBC2qe =
{
1 if (Pλ ≤ 0.10),
0 if (Pλ > 0.10).
(4)
We also take into account that election-motivated expansionary fiscal policies may increase
economic growth right before the elections, which, in turn, may increase the number of votes
received by the government parties. We estimate the following equation:
yEqe = ϕq + φjZjqe + χqPBCqe + μyt + ηyi + uyqt , (5)
where yEqt represents economic growth per capita according to Eq. (3) in an election year E
and Zjqe is a vector with explanatory variables used by Mankiw et al. (1992), which includes
initial real GDP per capita, investment, secondary school enrollment, and the growth of the
population. The control variables are defined as averages during the incumbent government’s
term in office excluding the election year. The variables μyt and η
y
i measure the fixed time
16We also tested a government party ideology variable. However, the correlation between the coalition ideol-
ogy and government party ideology exceeds 0.8. We therefore include only the ideology of the coalition. The
correlation matrix is shown in Appendix 3.
17Our qualitative results do not change when we use 5 % significance level as cut-off point (results are
available on request).
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and country effects, respectively, while uyqt is an error term. Eqs. (2) and (5) are estimated
with a multilevel simultaneous equation model.18
4.2 Results
Table 2 reports our estimation results for Eqs. (2) and (5). Due to data limitations, the num-
ber of countries drops to 59. Column (1) shows our baseline model for the electoral sup-
port received by the parties in government that is derived using the general-to-specific ap-
proach. That is, we start by estimating a model including all explanatory variables outlined
in Sect. 4.1. Next, we drop the least significant variable from the regression specification and
estimate the model again. We repeat this procedure until only variables that are significant at
the 10 % level remain (see Hendry 1993). An increase in the share of votes to the incumbent
party indicates a vote loss of other political parties participating in the election. Therefore
we cluster the standard errors at the election level.
The results for the intra-class correlation, which measures the distribution of the total
variance, shows that about half of the total variance is due to the variance at the coalition
level. This indicates that a multilevel model is appropriate.
We find a significantly negative effect of the number of parties participating in the elec-
tion. Also political protest has a negative effect on the electoral support for the parties in
government. Furthermore, fractionalization reduces the share of the votes received by the
parties in government. Also the coefficients of the variable reflecting the number of years
that a party has been in government and of the dummy for the largest coalition party are
negative.
Our results for the economic variables are in line with the conclusions of Kramer (1971),
Tufte (1978), Hibbs (1987), Lewis-Beck (1988) and Nannestad and Paldam (1994) as infla-
tion and economic growth19 are important determinants of the popularity of the incumbent.
Also spending on welfare has a positive effect on the votes received by the government
parties.
Our model for economic growth confirms the findings of Mankiw et al. (1992) that initial
GDP (measured by the 10-year lagged GDP per capita) and (human and physical) capital
are significantly related to real GDP growth per capita.
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 we add our PBC indicators based on the impact of elec-
tions on the budget balance. As shown in column (2) of Table 2, election-induced increases
in the budget deficit as measured by PBC1 raise the electoral support for the incumbent
government parties. We find that a one-point increase in PBC1 increases the vote share of
the parties in government by 0.41 % (p = 0.06). As shown in column (3), PBC2 also is
significant indicating that an increase in the budget deficit for electoral reasons increases
the number of votes for the incumbent political parties in the next election. The estimates
suggest that a political cycle in the government deficit increases the vote share of the parties
in government by 1.1 % (p = 0.06). So although the PBC2 measure is significant, the size
of the effect is quite small. In contrast to the direct impact, there is no indirect impact of
election-induced budget deficits as the PBC1 and PBC2 variables are not significant in the
growth regression.
18We do not present the reduced form of the vote equation in which we substitute the pre-election growth
regression into the vote regression, because we are interested in the separate effect of PBCs on voting and
economic growth. However, we have also estimated the reduced form and the results are in line with the main
model.
19We exclude economic growth during the election year because this variable is taken up in the regression
separately.
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Next we add our PBC variables that are based on the impact of elections on government
spending. Both PBC1 (column 4) and PBC2 (column 5) are significant. A one-point increase
in PBC1 increases the voting share of the parties in government by 0.57 % (p = 0.02).
So although the marginal effect of the PBC1 measure is significant, the size of the effect
is again quite small. According to the coefficient of PBC2, election-induced increases in
government spending increase the voting share by 2.5 % (p = 0.04). Furthermore, we find
a significantly positive indirect effect of expansionary fiscal policy on the election outcome
through higher economic growth in an election year. However, this effect also is rather small.
The incumbent government parties increase their share of votes by only 0.03 % through the
pre-election economic growth channel.
In conclusion, even though we find evidence that election motivated fiscal policies in-
crease the electoral support for the political parties in the government, the increase in elec-
toral support is rather minor. This can be illustrated by calculating the effect of election-
motivated fiscal policy on the votes received by the parties in government for the five coun-
tries with the strongest PBCs. These countries are Turkey, Zambia, Japan, Nicaragua and
Malaysia for the PBC in the budget balance and Japan, Malaysia, Turkey, Romania and
Colombia for the PBC in government spending. Our estimates suggest that in these coun-
tries election-motivated increases in the budget deficit increase the share of the votes of
the parties in government by about 0.76 %, while election-induced increases in government
spending increases the share of votes by about 5.07 %.
However, pre-election growth and the election outcome on the one hand and the exis-
tence of a PBC on the other may be determined by similar factors. For instance, institutional
factors are important determinants of economic growth and some of these (such as the pres-
ence of checks and balances) may also affect the existence of political budget cycles. When
we fail to control explicitly for these factors, our results might be biased. We therefore use
instrumental variables. Brender and Drazen (2005) argue that the existence of a PBC is pri-
marily a phenomenon in new democracies and we therefore use the number of years that a
country has been a democracy since 1945 according to Polity IV as an instrument. In ad-
dition, we use the level of democracy, also taken from Polity IV, and the lagged dependent
variable as instruments.
We check the validity of our instrumental variables used by the Sargan test under the
null hypothesis that our set of instruments is valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error
term in the structural equation. The results indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
indicating that our set of instruments is valid (p > 0.05). Next, we apply the Wald test of
exogeneity under the null hypothesis that the instrumented variable is exogenous (p < 0.05).
The results confirm that our set of instruments is valid. The results of the IV regression,
presented in columns (6)–(9), are similar to the OLS results presented in columns (2)–(5) of
Table 2.20
4.3 Robustness checks
It is possible that outliers affect the estimation results. Therefore, we re-estimate the regres-
sions in columns (3) and (5) of Table 2 excluding country-years where the dependent or
the PBC variable are classified as outlier to test for the sensitivity of our findings for the
20As suggested by the referee, we have also included the instruments as covariates in the model. The results
(available on request) are in line with the results reported in the paper.
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Table 3 Sensitivity analysis using PBC2
Vote regression Growth regression
Coefficient t-ratio p-value Coefficient t-ratio p-value
(1) Outlier correction
Budget balance cycle 1.650 1.721 0.086 −0.260 1.450 0.147
Spending cycle 2.734 2.536 0.011 0.334 2.145 0.032
(2) Learning effect sample
Budget balance cycle 1.200 1.566 0.118 0.217 1.571 0.116
Spending cycle 1.957 1.922 0.055 0.275 1.752 0.080
(3) Low governance countries
Budget balance cycle 1.775 1.823 0.069 −0.302 1.316 0.189
Spending cycle 3.473 2.736 0.006 0.468 2.769 0.006
(4) High governance countries
Budget balance cycle 0.995 1.864 0.063 −0.201 1.113 0.266
Spending cycle 2.197 1.601 0.110 0.216 1.845 0.065
(5) Largest party
Budget balance cycle 0.616 1.781 0.075 0.318 1.715 0.087
Spending cycle 1.238 1.924 0.055 0.397 2.593 0.010
(6) Coalition
Budget balance cycle 2.053 1.832 0.067 −0.512 1.553 0.121
Spending cycle 4.765 2.875 0.004 0.368 2.184 0.029
Note: Column (1) shows the results for the impact of a PBC when we delete the observations which are not
in the range: x < Q(25) − 3IQR or x > Q(75) + 3IQR; column (2) shows the results for the impact of a
PBC for countries which have been democratic for the last fifteen out of twenty years; column (3) shows the
results for the impact of a PBC in a sample of countries with low levels of governance; column (4) shows the
results for the impact of a PBC for a sample of countries with high levels of governance; column (5) shows
the results for the impact of a PBC on the votes for the largest party in cabinet; and column (6) shows the
results for the impact of a PBC using the change of votes of the total coalition as dependent variable
selection of countries in our sample.21 As follows from the first part of Table 3, the results
are similar to those reported earlier.
Brender and Drazen (2005) argue that voters punish incumbents for deficits and wasteful
spending. However, to punish the government voters need to have the information necessary
to draw such inferences, as well as the ability to process that information correctly. This
requires some experience with the electoral process. In the absence of this experience, it
is more likely that fiscal manipulation will be rewarded rather than punished. To control
for the learning effect suggested by Brender and Drazen (2005), we re-estimate our models
including country-years only if the country concerned has been democratic for at least 15
of the last 20 years.22 We still find a mixed sample of countries in which elections have an
effect on spending and the budget balance (results are available upon request). The results
for the voting model (shown in the second part of Table 3) confirm most of our previous
findings. We find a significant direct popularity effect through government spending and an
21Outliers are defined as: x < Q(25) − 3IQR or x > Q(75) + 3IQR, where Q is the quantile and IQR the
interquantile range given by 75th percentile–25th percentile.
22See also Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004).
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indirect growth effect through government spending. However, the coefficient of the PBC2
budget deficit indicator is no longer significant.
As an additional test, we include in the regressions of Table 1 a variable measuring the
number of years since 1945 that a country has been democratic and make the PBC effect
conditional on this variable by including an interaction term between it and the election
variable. Following Brambor et al. (2006), we calculate the total marginal effect of the in-
teraction term evaluated at the mean of the number of democratic years since 1945 in a
country.23 The results for the PBC are similar to our earlier results. Also the findings for
the second stage regression for votes received by political parties do not change much (all
results are available upon request).24
Next, earlier studies of the existence of political budget cycles point out that electoral
budgetary policies are stronger when politicians are less credible and fiscal policy is less
transparent (Alt and Lassen 2006; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). To examine whether this notion
affects our results, we split our sample into two equal-sized groups based on the level of
governance. We measure the level of governance by the first principal component of var-
ious indicators of corruption, democratic accountability, bureaucracy and rule of law in a
particular country-year taken from the International Country Risk Guide. The results in Ta-
ble 3 show that in both samples the expansionary election effect is significant, although, the
impact is larger in the ‘low governance’ sample.
Finally, our dependent variable is measured at the party level. However, it may be argued
that coalition members are considered to be jointly responsible for fiscal policy. Therefore,
we use two alternative dependent variables in the second step of our estimation. First, we
use the change in votes for the largest coalition party. Second, we use the change in votes
for the total coalition. The results in the bottom rows of Table 3 show a similar pattern as in
our main model of Table 2.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we combine two strands of the political economy literature. The first strand
focuses on the existence of political budget cycles, while the second strand is concerned
with the political and economic determinants of election outcomes.
We find that in most countries fiscal policy is hardly used for electoral purposes. Using a
multilevel voting model for coalition parties in government with a large number of control
variables, we find that parties in government can influence the election outcome significantly
by manipulating government spending. Government spending also has an indirect positive
effect on the support received by the parties in government by promoting faster economic
growth in the election year. Although we find a statistically significant effect of election-
induced government spending on election outcomes, its economic significance is relatively
small. This could explain why fiscal policy is used for election purposes in only a few
countries.
23In contrast, Greene (2010) argues that the significance of the interaction term should be examined using
the t-statistic. An insignificant t-statistic indicates a mis-specified econometric model. However, in our case,
the interaction term has a p-value of 0.04, which is significant at a 5 % significance level.
24We also consider an interaction between the election variable and the number of coalition parties. However,
the results remain in line with those reported.
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Appendix 1: Sample of countries and years
Country Included
since
Balance Spending Country Included
since
Balance Spending
Albania 1991 −2.44 1.37 Japan 1975 −1.75 ◦ 2.45 ◦
Argentina 1983 −1.70 1.61 Korea (South) 1975 −0.15 0.16
Australia 1976 −0.97 0.29 Lithuania* 1992 −1.11 1.70
Austria 1975 −0.97 1.06 Luxembourg 1976 −0.84 0.62
Bangladesh 1977 −0.81 1.04 Malaysia 1978 −1.37 ◦ 2.11
Belgium 1977 −0.38 0.29 Mali 1979 −0.20 0.34 ◦
Bolivia 1985 −1.46 0.97 ◦ Mauritius 1981 −0.65 ◦ 0.60
Brazil 1982 −0.37 ◦ 0.37 ◦ Mexico 1976 −0.47 0.36 ◦
Bulgaria 1990 −0.40 1.32 ◦ Nepal* 1981 −2.40 1.84
Canada 1986 −0.28 0.23 Netherlands 1977 −2.37 2.20
Chile 1975 −1.19 0.39 New Zealand 1977 −0.76 ◦ 0.86 ◦
Colombia 1975 −1.13 ◦ 1.40 ◦ Nicaragua 1984 −1.79 ◦ 1.50
Costa Rica 1975 0.06 0.40 ◦ Norway 1977 −0.20 0.19 ◦
Cyprus 1975 −0.27 0.62 ◦ Panama 1989 −2.30 1.53
Czech Republic 1993 −0.57 ◦ 0.44 ◦ Paraguay 1978 −1.26 1.01
Denmark 1977 −0.15 ◦ 0.30 Peru 1980 −1.16 1.39 ◦
Dominican Rep 1978 −0.09 1.63 Philippines 1960 −1.12 ◦ 0.89
Ecuador 1979 −1.69 ◦ 1.53 ◦ Poland* 1991 −0.54 0.95
El Salvador 1977 −1.36 1.08 Portugal 1976 −0.42 0.56 ◦
Estonia* 1991 0.13 1.27 Romania 1990 −1.24 ◦ 2.00 ◦
Fiji 1975 −0.59 0.89 Slovakia 1994 −0.52 0.18
Finland 1975 −0.58 0.61 South Africa 1994 −1.08 1.73
France 1977 −0.75 ◦ 0.95 Spain 1978 −0.82 ◦ 0.80 ◦
Germany 1976 −0.60 ◦ 0.71 Sri Lanka 1978 −1.63 ◦ 0.96
Greece 1975 −0.69 ◦ 0.62 Sweden 1978 −0.42 0.52
Guatemala 1975 0.10 0.34 ◦ Switzerland 1975 −0.54 ◦ 0.34
Honduras 1982 −0.49 ◦ 0.49 ◦ Trinidad* 1976 −0.29 0.38
Hungary 1990 −1.69 1.72 Turkey 1976 −2.56 ◦ 1.79 ◦
Iceland* 1975 −1.08 0.54 United Kingdom 1975 −0.52 0.69
India 1977 −0.55 1.65 ◦ United States 1976 −0.92 1.05
Ireland 1977 −0.55 0.35 Uruguay 1985 −0.81 ◦ 1.23 ◦
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Country Included
since
Balance Spending Country Included
since
Balance Spending
Israel 1977 −0.79 1.11 ◦ Zambia 1978 −1.95 ◦ 1.04
Italy 1975 −0.13 ◦ 0.23 ◦
Note: The figures in the columns show the estimated effect of elections on the fiscal variables. The figures
are based on the cross-partial derivative of the PBC coefficient from the semi-pooled model; ◦ indicates a
significant political budget cycle effect (at 10 percent significance level) in the semi-pooled model
Appendix 2: Data sources
Variable Definition Source
Election Election variable (see main text for details) Own calculations based on
Political Handbook of the
World (various issues)
Per capita real
income
GDP per capita in 1970 in constant US dollars of
2000
World Bank (2006)
Economic growth Growth rate of real GDP per capita Heston et al. (2006)
Globalization KOF Globalization index Dreher (2008)
Dependency ratio The ratio of the population older then 65 to the
population between 15 and 64
World Bank (2006)
Inflation rate Change in Consumer Price Index IMF (2006)
Unemployment
rate
Total rate of unemployment of people of
working age
IMF (2006), World Bank
(2006), UN (2006), ILO
(2006), OECD (2006)
Partisan variable Government ideology measure ranging from −1
(full left wing) to +1 (full right wing)
Update of Beck et al. (2001)
Majoritarian
system
Dummy variable that is one if the election is in a
majority electoral system
Update of Beck et al. (2001),
Election Resources (2007)
Parliamentary
system
Dummy variable that is one if the election is in a
parliamentary system
Update of Beck et al. (2001),
Election Resources (2007)
Number of
coalition parties
Number of coalition parties Update of Beck et al. (2001),
Election Resources (2007)
Monetary union Dummy variable taken the value 1 if a country
year is a member of a monetary union, otherwise
0
IMF (2006)
Change in votes Change in the share of votes of government
party q
Election Resources (2007)
Average welfare
spending
Sum of government spending on health,
education and social security as a share of GDP
IMF (2006), World Bank
(2006), UN (2006), ILO
(2006), OECD (2006)
Change income
distribution
Change in household income inequality within
the government term
University of Texas inequality
project (2006), World Bank
(2006)
Budget balance Government budget balance within the
government term (see main text for details)
IMF (2006), World Bank
(2006), UN (2006), ILO
(2006), OECD (2006)
Political protest First principle component of anti-governmental
demonstrations, strikes, government crises and
cabinet changes.
Own estimations based on
Databanks International
(2005)
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Variable Definition Source
Polarization Difference between the ideology of the
incumbent government and the ideology of the
two largest opposition parties
Update of Beck et al. (2001)
Majority vs.
proportional
Dummy variable that is one if the election is in a
majority electoral system
Update of Beck et al. (2001),
Election Resources (2007)
Parliamentary vs.
presidential
Dummy variable that is one if the election is in a
parliamentary system
Update of Beck et al. (2001),
Election Resources (2007)
Number of
parties
Number of competing parties in an election Election Resources (2007)
Voter turnout Number of voters divided by the population in
the voting age
Election Resource (2007)
Term limit chief
executive
Dummy variable that is one if the chief
executive is in his final legal term
Update of Beck et al. (2001)
Fractionalization
index
Herfindahl index of the number of seats of
coalition parties
Update of Beck et al. (2001),
Election Resources (2007)
Minority
government
Dummy variable that is one if the share of seats
of the government coalition in parliament is less
then 50 %
Update of Beck et al. (2001),
Election Resources (2007)
Number of
coalition parties
Number of government parties Update of Beck et al. (2001),
Election Resources (2007)
Largest coalition
party
Dummy variable if the party is the largest
coalition party
Election Resources (2007)
Number of years
in coalition
Total number of years in the coalition without a
switch
Update of Beck et al. (2001)
and own calculations by
extending Beck et al. (2001)
Nationalistic
party
Dummy variable if the party is nationalistic Update of Beck et al. (2001)
and own calculations by
extending Beck et al. (2001)
Special interest
party
Dummy variable if the party is based on special
interest issues
Update of Beck et al. (2001)
and own calculations by
extending Beck et al. (2001)
Political budget
cycle
The PBC indicator (see main text for details) Own calculations
Election year
growth rate
Weighted growth rate of real GDP per capita
(see main text for details)
Heston et al. (2006)
Investment Gross fixed investment as a share of GDP World Bank (2006)
Population
growth
Growth rate of the population World Bank (2006)
Human capital Secondary education attainment EDUSTAT (2006), Barro and
Lee (2001), own calculation
by extending the five year
periods to time series
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix of control variables
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